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Abstract 
 
Banking organizations have peculiar characteristics that make it difficult for them to adopt and apply 
traditional corporate governance models. However, little attention has been given to understanding 
and theorizing banking corporate governance. Deploying a grounded theory methodology this paper 
develops a substantive theory of banking corporate governance within Egypt. Subsequently, through 
sociological institutionalism the substantive theory is further analyzed and assessed; findings indicate 
that banking corporate governance is an evolving context or contingency based phenomenon. 
Corporate governance for banks in Egypt involves an institutionalization process based on regulative 
and normative pressures that looks to ensure legitimacy from shareholders, regulators and depositors. 
This said, to maintain legitimacy banks either comply or disguise their non-compliance. Overall, this 
paper contributes to non-traditional corporate governance theorizing and offers policy-makers a 
distinct in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In any contemporary business environment 
appropriate corporate governance structures and 
practices are crucial for ensuring effective banking 
within developing, transitional and developed 
economies. It has been argued, that weak corporate 
governance has been a major reason for many banking 
crises (Barth et al., 2007; Nam and Lum, 2006). 
Indeed, the global financial crisis of 2007 indicated 
that appropriate corporate governance measures for 
financial institutions cannot be compromised (De 
Larosiére et al., 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Furthermore, because banking has peculiar 
characteristics that intensify requirements for robust 
corporate governance (that is, they differ from other 
organisations) certain commentators consider that the 
corporate governance of banking has not been given 
the attention other sectors have experienced (Barth et 
al., 2007; Caprio and Levine, 2002; De Larosiere et 
al., 2009; Levine, 2003; Macay and O’hara, 2003; 
Mullineux, 2006).  In short, corporate governance 
research has paid less attention to banking 
organizations than it has non-financial institutions 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mulbert, 2010).   
The financial crisis emphasized the importance 
of Bank Corporate Governance (BCG) especially in 
the context of developing economies given the 
dominant position of banks in these underdeveloped 
financial markets (Arun and Turner, 2004; Barth et 
al.,  2007; Capri and Leveine, 2002; Das and Ghosh, 
2004; Levine, 2003).  Moreover, the recent 
liberalization of banking sectors in developing 
countries through privatization and divestment along 
with the reduction of economic regulation has given 
bank executives more freedom in determining 
management practices in setting priorities for interests 
(Nam, 2007). Fundamentally, analysis of banking 
collapses in developing economies illustrates close 
correlation with factors related to weak corporate 
governance. 
The Egyptian Banking Sector (EBS) has specific 
reasons for necessitating robust corporate governance 
procedures e.g. the EBS provides over 85% of 
business financing so of paramount importance to the 
Egyptian economy (El-said, 2009).  Furthermore, 
banks have been assigned the role of promoting 
compliance with the Egyptian codes of corporate 
governance (ECOCG, 2005; 2011) and before 
requiring full compliance from other organizations 
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should ensure that they themselves fully adopt 
corporate governance principles.  Overall, weak 
corporate governance has been seen as a main reason 
behind Egyptian bank failures during the late 1990s 
and the associated non-performing loan problem that 
burdens the EBS today (CBE, 2008). Indeed, in 
response to corporate governance deficiencies the 
Egyptian authorities initiated a reform program to 
address improvements in corporate governance (CBE, 
2003; 2009).  
This paper queries theoretical perspectives 
usually used for explaining and analyzing corporate 
governance and through the development of a 
substantive theory and Neo-Institutional Sociological 
Theory (NIST) undertakes a study of Egyptian 
banking corporate governance. Initially, this paper 
critiques agency/shareholder and stakeholder theories 
and considers other frameworks that may provide 
means of assessing corporate governance procedures 
in banks. Second, we explain our methodological 
approach and identify how through data collection 
and analysis we develop a substantive theory. Third, a 
substantive theory is developed and through this and 
NIST issues relating to Egyptian banking corporate 
governance are further explored and analyzed. 
Finally, through the development of the substantive 
theory and analysis through NIST both theoretical and 
practical conclusions are reached. 
 
2 Banks and traditional corporate 
governance theorizing 
 
Two principal theories (agency/shareholder and 
stakeholder) are usually utilized to understand and 
explain corporate governance (Maher and Andersson, 
2000; Chilosi and Damiani, 2007; Carillo, 2007; 
Freeman and Reed, 1983; Friedman and   Miles, 
2002; Gamble and Kelly, 2001; Kakabadse and   
Kakabadse, 2001; Keay, 2010; Letza and Sun, 2002; 
Letza et al., 2004; Letza et al., 2008; O’Sullivan, 
2000; Omran et al., 2002). On one hand, Shareholder 
theory considers that the purpose of the corporation is 
to maximize shareholder wealth and identifies the 
main corporate governance dichotomy as emanating 
from agency problems which emerge from the 
separation of ownership and control. Fundamentally, 
with distinctions between ownership and control 
comes conflict of interests between the principal 
(shareholders) and the agent (managers) (Carrillo, 
2007; Letza et al., 2004; Letza et al., 2008). On the 
other hand, the stakeholder perspective argues that the 
purpose of the corporation is to serve the interests of a 
number of stakeholders (not shareholders alone) and 
that corporate governance problems relate to the 
consideration of non-share owning stakeholder 
interests and potential conflict of interests between 
stakeholders per se (Carrillo,  2007; Letza et al.,  
2004; Letza et al.,  2008). As such, the adoption of 
either perspectives of corporate governance 
(Shareholder v. Stakeholder) is to a great extent a 
decision based on particular conceptions of the 
company, its purposes and its legal and political 
foundations (Gamble and  Kelly, 2001; Howell,  
2007a; 2007b).  
However, with their special features banks it is 
easier for insiders (managers and large investors) to 
‘exploit private benefits of control rather maximizing 
value for shareholders’ (Zingales, 1994: 4 cited in 
Caprio and Levine, 2002). As such self-interest and 
associated short-termism and excessive risk taking 
will result only in more conflict of interests with 
shareholders, as well as interests of the fixed 
claimants (depositors) who are risk averse. This led 
many researchers to claim that managers of banks 
have a fiduciary duty to both depositors and 
shareholders (Barth et al., 2007; Macay and O’Hara, 
2003; Mullineux, 2007). Accordingly, adopting the 
Anglo-Saxon shareholding model based on the 
agency theory and purpose of shareholder wealth 
maximisation only is deemed inappropriate in the case 
of banking organizations, because here corporate 
governance should look beyond those of the 
shareholders e.g. depositors (Mullineux, 2007). 
Macay and O’Hara (2003) recommended that banks 
should adopt a stakeholder model for dealing with 
corporate governance problems. However, adopting a 
pure stakeholder model of corporate governance in 
banking organization would face the difficulty of 
stakeholder identification (Phillips, 1997; Howell, 
2007b). Therefore, the pure stakeholder model is also 
deemed inappropriate because it does not provide a 
concrete identification of stakeholders.  
In addition, many researchers have argued that 
different banking organization have many factors that 
shape corporate governance practices (Lubatkin et al., 
2005; Ratnatunga and Ariff, 2005; Rwegasira, 2000). 
Moreover, the factors shaping corporate governance 
in individual states do not necessarily have to be 
similar from one country to another. Consequently, a 
universal approach is problematic and issues may 
only be understood through relativist and empirical 
corporate governance research (Durisin and Puzone, 
2009; Lee and Yoo, 2008; Letza et al., 2008; 
Ratnatunga and Ariff, 2005; Smallman, 2007). 
Indeed, it must be noted that the global financial crisis 
has demonstrated that these traditional corporate 
governance models (shareholding and stakeholding 
models) are inappropriate and different perspectives 
required if new avenues of improvement are to be 
investigated.   
Letza et al. (2008: 22) argued that even though 
shareholder and stakeholder theories have specific 
worldviews and perspectives both share a ‘normative 
rational model’ when assessing corporate governance 
procedures. The principal-agent (shareholder model of 
corporate governance) is based on efficiency theory, 
while elements of the stakeholder model, despite its 
focus on corporate ethical behaviour and social 
responsibility, posits that ‘ethical business is more 
rational and more efficient’ (Letza et al., 2008: 23-
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24). Interestingly, Freeman et al. (2004:366) 
acknowledged difficulties with single objective 
theoretical frameworks for explaining social 
phenomenon when he argued that ‘the world is 
complex, and managers and directors are bounded 
rationally (at least we can meet economists on their 
own assumptions)’. Indeed, it is argued that both 
shareholder and stakeholder theoretical perspectives 
share similar economic efficiency driven foundations 
and that such a normative stance may be criticized 
because it ignores social processes related to 
corporate governance that are embedded in particular 
contextual factors (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Ardalan, 2007; Kirkbride et al., 2005; Letza and Sun, 
2002; Letza et al., 2004; Mason et al., 2007; Letza et 
al., 2008). Contextual factors that encompass crucial 
determinates relating to corporate governance may 
include many non-economic and efficiency factors 
such as ‘power, legislation, social relationships and 
institutional contexts’ (Ardalan, 2007: 511) as well as 
‘politics, ideologies, philosophies, legal systems, 
social conventions, cultures and models of thought’ 
(Letza et al., 2004: 258). Moreover, traditional 
corporate governance theories adopt a closed system 
approach of institutional analysis, especially the 
shareholder perspective (Aguilera et al. 2008) which 
isolates corporate governance perspectives ‘from 
social and other non-economic conditions’ (Letza et 
al., 2008:256). Finally, the economic/efficiency 
perspective looks at corporate governance as a static 
object which is not ‘compatible with the fluidity and 
diversity of practical reality’ (Letza et al., 2004: 257). 
On the contrary, corporate governance is a socially 
embedded complex phenomenon that requires 
analysis based on a dynamic process driven basis to 
be able to explain ‘the temporary, transient and 
emergent patterns of corporate governance on a 
historical and contextual basis in a given society’ 
(Ardalan, 2007: 511). This given, a different approach 
to assessing and analyzing corporate governance 
procedures was deemed necessary and a number of 
researchers have employed New Institutional 
Sociological Theory (NIST) (for further details see 
Chizema and  Buck,  2006; Chizema,  2008; Judge 
and Kutan,  2008; Lee and Yoo,  2008; Seal,  2006; 
Zattoni and  Cuomo,  2008). The main focus of this 
paper is to present a grounded account of corporate 
governance using a non-traditional theoretical lens. It 
is an attempt to contribute towards greater 
understanding of bank corporate governance as a 
context based or contingent dynamic rather than a 
static phenomenon, As such, to set the substantive 
theory and NIST in context, we have opted to initially 
present, a critical account of  traditional theoretical 
perspectives used for corporate governance 
theorizing. We then outline data collection procedure 
and research methodology through which, the 
substantive theory was developed then further 
explored using NIST. It is important to identify that 
the substantive theory is based on Straussian 
grounded theory coding techniques (open-axial-
selective) and constant comparative method. Coding 
of data collected from the field eventually leads to the 
substantive theory of BCG reform in the EBS. 
In the following sections of this paper a 
substantive theory is developed (section 2 and 3), an 
overview of alternative theoretical framework is 
presented (section 4) and an example of NIST 
analysis regarding corporate governance is employed 
(section 5).  
 
3 Methodology and methods: developing 
substantive theory 
 
Grounded theory research does not normally follow 
the traditional positivistic paradigm of inquiry and 
presenting grounded research in its pure form in an 
article of this type ‘would be neither efficient nor 
comprehensible’ (Suddaby, 2006: 637). In other 
words, reporting the detailed analysis of grounded 
theory research that is based on coding and the 
constant comparative method (open, axial, selective 
coding stages) would entail a lengthy and complicated 
exposition (Suddaby, 2006). In this paper, we outline 
the theoretical concepts that emerged through coding 
data incidents into categories which emerged from the 
both data and existing categories while these and their 
properties were integrated to identify the developing 
substantive theory (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 101-
115)  
This paper uses grounded theory methodology to 
build a substantive theory of corporate governance 
within the EBS. Grounded theory aims to develop a 
substantive theory through comparative analysis and 
coding procedures (Howell, 2000). Glaser and Strauss 
(1967: 32) argued that substantive theory is 
‘developed from a substantive, or empirical, area of 
sociological inquiry ... such as ... organizations’. 
Grounded theory ‘is based on the systematic 
generation of theory from data, that itself is 
systematically obtained from social research. Thus, 
the grounded theory method offers a rigorous orderly 
guide to theory development’ (Glaser, 1978: 2). 
Indeed, through comparative analysis grounded 
theory aims to build substantive theory through 
developing ‘general categories’ (Howell, 2000). It 
does not assume that the inquirer knows the 
substantive areas better than those being researched 
nor does it assume that a theory will be incorporate a 
finished product (Howell,  2000). Grounded theory 
attempts to generate theory based on data collected 
and analyzed simultaneously as the research 
progresses (Howell, 2000). Grounded theory is an 
‘inductive qualitative methodology that allows the 
researcher to identify the main concern of a group of 
subjects and the behaviours they use to resolve their 
main concern’ (Artinian et al., 2009: 3). 
In this paper grounded theory methodology is 
illustrated in the following ways. First, through an 
application of the comparative method in the open 
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coding stage based on semi-structured interviews (A) 
conducted with bank directors and executives, 
government officials, auditors and central bank 
officials which developed categories and identified 
their properties and dimensions. Indeed, the 
interviews were informed by a survey of BCG 
practices. Second, through axial coding open 
categories were subsumed into broader categories, 
and the relationships among these categories 
established by means of the paradigm model. This led 
to the Bank Action Choice Matrix and the Paradigm 
Model of Evolving BCG in the EBS. The earlier 
models the relationship between the organizational 
characteristics of the bank and the choice of its 
strategic response of either to comply with 
governance requirements or disguising its non-
compliance. While, the paradigm model of evolving 
BCG links various main categories with the 
phenomenon of evolving BCG practices. Axial coding 
provided the basis of the substantive theory. Third, 
selective coding based on a second round of semi-
structured interviews (B) identified the core category, 
verified its relationships with other sub-categories and 
eventually presented the substantive theory of BCG. 
The Survey was sent to senior bankers from 30 
commercial banks with a response rate of 70%. The 
survey is composed of 14 statements that address 
corporate governance practices quality of banks (see 
Table 1). The issues that the survey identified were 
further investigated through the semi-structured 
interviews (A) which included: shareholder and 
stakeholder interests, the role of the board in 
corporate governance practices, transparency, and 
disclosure and ownership type. 58 semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken and broken down into 
categories (A) and (B). Interviews (A) included 44 
interviews based on  14 questions as with grounded 
theory techniques however, as data collection and 
analysis were in parallel, emerging concepts were 
taken to subsequent interviews to be verified (see 
Tables 2 and 3 for interviews questions and 
statements) .  
Categories that emerged during open coding can 
be further arranged and linked together to form a 
coherent overall system (Howell, 2000). The Axial 
coding process developed five main categories 
developed through axial coding involved: drivers, 
obstacles, reform strategies, contextual factors and 
evolving BCG practices. These categories were 
related together by means of the coding paradigm 
model which included identifying the phenomenon 
studied, the context where it is embedded, the 
intervening conditions, the causal conditions, actions/ 
interactional strategies and their consequences 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 1998). More precisely 
drivers are the causal conditions, evolving BCG 
practices is the phenomenon; while obstacles 
represent the intervening conditions; reform strategies 
are the action / interactional strategies that occurred 
with the consequences of enhancing banks' 
legitimacy, improved protection of shareholders' and 
depositors in addition to bringing further corporate 
governance  reform. Indeed the phenomenon 
represents the category and other components of the 
paradigm model are sub-categories.  
Finally, at the selective coding stage, the Semi-
structured interviews (B) contributed towards 
identification of the core category of BCG reform and 
verified relationships with sub-categories using 
Strauss and Corbin’s (1990; 1998) paradigm model, 
and eventually arriving to the substantive theory. 
Overall, the substantive theory is the result of coding, 
categorization and comparative analysis of data 
systematically collected for this study through a 
survey and the two rounds of semi-structured 
interviews. It reflects the opinions of bank directors 
and executives, CB officials and auditors. As such it 
is grounded on data obtained from substantive area 
(EBS). The substantive theory exemplify a system of 
BCG reform, it captures some of the complexities of 
the real life by accounting for both the structure where 
the phenomenon of BCG reform is embedded as well 
as the processes taking place. It shows the interaction 
and interplay between BCG reform and the banking 
environment that indeed leads to the evolution of 
BCG practices in the EBS. 
 
Table 1. Grouped Survey Statements 
 
Related Statements Group 
1. The bank's current corporate governance structures serve the interests of 
shareholders. 
2. The bank's current corporate governance structures serve the interests of 
the following non-share owning stakeholders. 
      a. Depositors 
      b. Employees 
      c. Local society 
      d. The Environment 
Stakeholders' Interests 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 10, Issue 1, 2012, Continued - 7 
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3. The banks' board functions include over-sight and approval of corporate 
governance practices. 
4. The Bank's key executives and broad members regularly attend training 
courses on issues of corporate governance. 
5. The board of director's conducts self evaluation or reviews of its 
effectiveness. 
6. The bank's chairman is independent of the CEO. 
7. The bank utilized specialized board committees in relation to corporate 
governance e.g. Audit/ corporate governance, nomination, remuneration 
committees etc. 
8. The specialized committees are composed of independent directors. 
9. The banks overall risk strategy requires the evaluation of the clients' 
corporate governance quality. 
Board of Directors 
corporate governance 
practices 
 
10. The bank's corporate governance structures are disclosed in the annual 
report along with latest financial results. 
11. The bank publishes corporate governance information and 
announcements on its website. 
Communication of 
Corporate Governance 
Information to Stakeholders 
 
Table 2. Interview (A) questions 
 
INTERVIEW (A) QUESTIONS* 
 
1. Does the type of bank ownership affect its quality of corporate governance practices? (Ownership 
type of the bank);  
2. Do laws and regulations effectively promote bank corporate governance? (shareholder and 
stakeholder interests);  
3. To what extent corporate governance affects competitiveness of the bank?; 
4. What are the mechanisms used by the CBE to enhance bank's corporate governance practices? 
(shareholders and stakeholders interests);  
5. On what basis a bank considers corporate governance reform? (shareholders and stakeholders 
interests); 
6. What bodies play an important role in bank’s corporate governance? What are these roles? (Bank 
Corporate Governance);  
7. Whose interests do banks’ corporate governance mechanisms protect? (shareholder and stakeholders 
interest);  
8. What role does the board have in the corporate governance of the bank and how effective is this? 
(The role of the board in corporate governance practices); 
9. How does the board (in general) ensure that members (of the board) understand their role in 
corporate governance? (The role of the board in corporate governance practices); 
10. What are the corporate governance mechanisms that banks utilize? (The role of the board in 
corporate governance practices);  
11. To what extent the bank insists on good corporate governance in credit operations and what 
benchmarks does the bank uses in this respect? (The role of the board in corporate governance 
practices);  
12. What impact does the Egyptian business culture have on corporate governance of banks? (Corporate 
governance culture);  
13. What is the basis to determine the risk management policy of the bank? (The role of the board in 
corporate governance practices);  
14. Have the accounting standards adopted enhanced transparency? (Transparency and disclosure). 
 
*
The Brackets at the end of each question shows the areas emerged from survey analysis and were further 
investigated in semi-structured interview (A) 
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Table 3. Interview (B) statements 
 
1. Bank corporate governance has witnessed reform due to pressures from the CBE, international 
organizations and the Egyptian government;  
2. Bank corporate governance reform aims at minimizing potential conflict of interests between 
shareholders, depositors and the regulator (CBE); hence better serving their interests; 
3. Bank corporate governance reform is an ongoing process taking place through the CBE's supervision 
to enhance the safety and soundness of the banking sector according to the international best 
practices; 
4. Variability of bank corporate governance practices is related to the differences in the corporate 
governance identity of the bank (management control, competence and organizational perception of 
corporate governance) as well as the limited corporate governance scope of applicable laws and 
regulations; 
5. Further reform should address the challenges of boards' ineffectiveness in corporate governance, 
market myopia (short-termism) and corporate governance cultural immaturity within the EBS.  
6. Banks respond to evolving corporate governance requirements resulting from reform either by 
compliance or disguising of non-compliance.  
7. The outcome of the compliance or disguising of non-compliance strategies in response to corporate 
governance reform includes enhancing bank's legitimacy towards the regulator and shareholders; 
improvement in interests protection and further corporate governance reform; 
8. The impact of corporate governance reform will vary between Foreign, Private Domestic, Arab and 
State banks within the EBS given their different corporate governance identities and qualities. 
 
4 Substantive theory of bank corporate 
governance reform 
 
The substantive theory can be summarized as follows: 
(a) BCG practices evolve from the on-going process 
of BCG reform. 
(b) BCG reform occurs due to pressures from 
various banking sector stakeholders, with the 
most influential pressure coming from the 
regulator and shareholders given their respective 
powers. 
(c) Improving BCG practices decrease potential 
conflicts of interests between shareholders, 
depositors and the regulator.  
(d) Contextual factors such as laws and regulations, 
and BCG culture/identity (degree of 
management control, employees' competence 
and organizational perception) are determinates 
of how banks respond to BCG reform 
requirements. 
(e) BCG reform faces obstacles that may alter or 
mitigate its impetus; this includes director’s 
ineffectiveness, short-termism and immaturity of 
Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture. 
(f) Banks adopt two strategies in response to BCG 
reform, either compliance or avoidance by 
disguising non-compliance. 
(g) The regulator manages BCG reform by the 
means of the supervision function and on-going 
updating and improving the function by 
investing in people and systems and co-
operating with other central banks. 
(h) BCG reform is given impetus by feedback 
regarding the achievement of reform objectives 
from both the regulator and recognized 
stakeholders perspective. As well as feed-
forward by the regulator to enhance BCG by 
implementing internationally accepted practices. 
(i) On-going BCG reform, induce banks to comply. 
While, supervision scrutinize compliance to 
address further BCG reforms. Meanwhile, the 
interplay with obstacles will eventually induce 
changes to occur, to cross these obstacles; this 
complex interplay will keep BCG practices 
evolving. 
(j) The corporate governance model prevailing in 
the EBS is a pluralistic model that aims to serve 
recognized stakeholders: shareholders, 
depositors and the regulator. 
As noted, the substantive theory is the result of 
coding, categorization and analysis of data 
systematically collected for this study through: a 
survey and two semi-structured interviews rounds. It 
reflects the opinions of bank directors and executives, 
CB officials and auditors. As such it is ground in data 
obtained from the substantive area (EBS). Finally, as 
the substantive theory exemplifies a system of BCG 
reform, it captures some of the complexities of the 
real life and demonstrates the interaction and interplay 
between BCG reform and the banking environment 
that leads to the evolution of BCG practices within the 
EBS. The next section develops the substantive theory 
further through using NIST to analyze and consider 
the issues raised and embed it in an institutional, 
cultural and environmental context. 
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5 Neo-Institutional sociological theory 
(NIST) 
 
NIST involves analysis of relationships between 
institutions and their environments (Sandhu, 2009).  
Scott (2001: xx) considered that NIST involved a 
continuation of open systems theory and goes beyond 
the institution under analysis and concentrates on the 
‘importance of the wider context or environment’. 
NIST emphasizes legitimacy and centrality of 
worldviews, routines, scripts and schema (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and 
focuses on the ‘deeper and resilient aspects of social 
structure’ (Scott 2005: 460). Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) stated that institutional adoption of formal 
structures takes place regardless of the efficiency 
notion. Fundamentally, NIST can be considered as a 
departure from interpretations of institutions based on 
the economic conceptions of rationality and efficiency 
(Mason et al., 2007). 
Because of the behaviour constraining nature of 
institutions legitimacy is a central concept for NIST; 
institutions operate through ‘defining legal, moral, 
and cultural boundaries setting off legitimate from 
illegitimate activities’ (Scott 2001: 50).Legitimacy 
refers to ‘a generalized perception or assumption that 
actions are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 574). 
Indeed, organizations actively seek legitimacy as they 
need more than ‘material resources and technical 
information if they are to survive and thrive in their 
social environments. They also need social 
acceptability and credibility’ (Scott et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, legitimacy may lead to better access to 
resources because stakeholders are more likely to 
provide their resources to legitimate rather 
illegitimate organizations (Parsons, 1960). Finally, 
legitimacy affects how people act towards 
organization and how they perceive them, as such 
‘audiences perceive the legitimate organizations not 
only as more worthy, but also as more meaningful, 
more predictable and more trustworthy’ (Suchman, 
1995: 575).  
 
5.1 NIST and corporate governance 
 
NIST has been used as a theoretical framework by a 
number of studies on corporate governance (Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazuraa, 2004; Ben-Messaoud, 2002; 
Deo et al., 2007; Enrione et al., 2006; Khadaroo and 
Shaikh, 2007; Siddiquie, 2010; Yoshikawa et al., 
2007; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). However, none 
developed a substantive theory then proceeded to use 
NIST for further analysis. This paper employs the 
notion of three institutional pillars (Scott, 1995; 
2001). These pillars demonstrate ‘different bases of 
order and compliance, varying mechanisms and 
logics, diverse empirical indicators, and alternative 
rationale for establishing legitimacy claims’ (Scott, 
2005a: 464). Moreover, each of the three pillars offers 
an ingredient for explaining institutions. Firstly, the 
regulative pillar gives priority to ‘rule setting, 
monitoring and sanctioning activities’ (Scott, 2005a: 
52). This pillar utilizes coercion as its primary 
mechanism, here conformity with rules and laws seek 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The second is based on 
‘normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, 
evaluative, and obligatory dimension in social life’ 
and depends on values and norms as the basis of 
social obligation (Scott, 2001: 54). The third pillar 
focuses on the significance of culture as the ‘shared 
conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality 
and frames through which meaning is made’ (Scott, 
2001:57). In this context, reality is constructed 
through interaction of individuals to create 
interpretations of what is going on in the surrounding 
environment (Scott, 2005b). This pillar explains how 
institutional structures and behaviour is shaped by 
cultural rules promoted within the external 
environment (Scott, 2005b). Here compliance of 
institutions with these cultural rules occurs because 
other types of behaviour cannot be understood (Scott, 
2005b). 
NIST provides a theoretical framework by which 
corporate governance phenomenon may be explored 
and useful for understanding issues such as corporate 
governance that is affected by the wider social 
environment (Scott,  2001). It can also be useful when 
examining the effects of an institution such as 
corporate governance on organizations within a 
particular field (Scott, 1987).  NIST emphasizes how 
institutions are embedded in social structures and pays 
attention to legitimacy as the main reason of 
institutional change rather than the economic notions 
of rationality and efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Fundamentally, 
NIST is able to offer a non-traditional avenue for 
better understanding corporate governance which 
pays attention to the importance of power and its 
reflection on actor interests (Scott, 2001; Dillard et 
al., 2004; Mason et al., 2007; Powell, 2008). Indeed, 
the concept of power is central to corporate 
governance as it can be perceived as the ‘exercise of 
power at the level of the corporate entity’ (Tricker, 
1997: 1). Indeed, legal, organizational, political and 
cultural factors affect BCG practices of various 
banking organizations. As such, from a NIST point of 
view, banking organizations can be analysed from an 
open system perspective, where their BCG practices 
are indeed, affected by ‘the wider context or 
environment’ (Scott, 2001: xx). Also this agrees with 
the argument that corporate governance is a social 
phenomenon that is affected by the institutional and 
social contexts in which it is embedded and based on 
non-economic factors such as culture, politics and 
legal aspects (Ardalan, 2007). Moreover, the 
institutional context includes human factors (Zingales, 
2004). Here, the substantive theory acknowledges that 
banking organizations seen as firms are composed of 
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human beings as such directors and executives’ 
competence has an influential impact on BCG 
practices. The substantive theory sees BCG practices 
as evolving and in continuous interplay with the 
environment, this also agrees with the social view of 
corporate governance that acknowledge that any 
corporate governance system will continue to evolve 
(Ardalan,  2007). 
 
5.2 Egyptian banking corporate 
governance: substantive theory and NIST 
 
According to the substantive theory BCG reform 
involves a process initiated due to the pressures 
exerted primarily by the CBE (Regulator). This said, 
other pressure groups indirectly influence this process 
such as international organization (World Bank and 
Basel committee on banking supervision); however 
these groups are only secondary and do not have the 
same power as the CBE. At the same time BCG 
reform is intended to serve and protect particular 
interests namely: depositors, shareholders, and the 
regulator. So the substantive theory is about the 
relative power of particular groups and how they 
protect their respective interests. Within the context of 
NIST, the BCG reform process can be considered as 
an institutionalization process, because 
‘institutionalization is a political process, and the 
success of the process and the form it takes depends 
on the relative power of the actors who strive to steer 
it’ (Powell, 2008: 5). Indeed, the most powerful actors 
in the process of BCG are the CBE (as the regulator 
of the banking sector) and shareholders. The power 
base of the CBE is founded on coercive power and the 
authority this institution has on various banks. 
Shareholder power is based on ownership and the 
high concentration ratio in most of banks, thus 
shareholders are a powerful actor within this process. 
In relation to BCG depositor power is opaque 
however, the CBE protect these interests to achieve its 
overriding objective of maintaining the soundness and 
safety of the EBS and avoidance corporate 
governance related bank failures.  
In addition, the substantive theory indicates that 
the Egyptian BCG reform process has been initiated 
on the basis of a regulative pillar that involves 
corporate governance related regulations issued by the 
CBE. It must be noted that the regulative pillar is 
accompanied with an informal structure or normative 
framework that entails obeying the CBE (where all 
banks agree that the interests of the CBE must be 
served at all times, indicating that obeying the 
commands is a binding expectation). This pillar 
utilizes coercive pressure on banks to comply with 
related BCG rules and regulations as well as 
normative pressures.  From a NIST perspective this 
involves a situation where coercive power is 
legitimated by a normative framework (second pillar). 
NIST also proposes that the institutionalization 
process based on the regulative pillar is carried 
through symbolic routines and carriers (Scott, 2001). 
This is commensurable in the substantive theory 
where BCG rules and regulations included in the 
banking law 88/2003 as well as the CBE directives 
represent symbolic carriers. Symbolic carriers denotes 
‘uniformity and … consistency of action’ (Scott, 
2001: 78), which is compliant with BCG rules and 
regulations; they employ the third pillar of culture and 
shared ideas. The coercive power associated with 
these rules and regulations represent relational system 
carriers. Finally, the CBE enacts two types of routines 
to scrutinize and verify the compliance of banks with 
BCG rules and regulations. These routines are the 
supervision function (on-site and off-site 
examination) and the external auditing function 
implemented by auditing firms. Here routines are 
attempts by the CBE to use various actors to 
‘formalize processes for checking suitability of 
governance activity’ (Mason et al., 2007: 294).  
The substantive theory also indicated that 
compliance with the BCG rules and regulations is 
based on seeking pragmatic legitimacy which 
involved ‘self-interested calculations’ (Suchman, 
1995:578). Pragmatic legitimacy must be perceived as 
appropriate by the CBE and shareholders and here 
entails adopting BCG requirements imposed by the 
CBE. Legitimacy is a principal framework governing 
banks and identifies the BCG adherence to a 
regulative pillar. Fundamentally, the substantive 
theory has indicated that even though normative 
pressures from the Egyptian Banking Institute (EBI), 
the Egyptian Institute of directors (EIOD) and 
international organizations exist the impact of these 
pressures is not strong enough to initiate change. The 
substantive theory indicated that the culture of 
corporate governance within the EBS is at its early 
stages of formation and that this requires 
deinstitutionalization of the rejection of corporate 
governance culture as well as the secrecy culture. 
Indeed the study acknowledges that this change 
involves a long term process. However, the NIST 
acknowledges that institutions and environments can 
be shaped by different combinations of the regulative, 
normative and cultural elements that vary from one 
context to overtime (Powell, 2008). Although 
currently the regulative element is salient, normative 
and culture-cognitive components may play a role 
over the long-term. 
BCG reform indicates the institutionalization 
process within the EBS which is currently based on a 
regulative aspect. Indeed, institutionalization 
especially from a social constructivism point of view 
indicates a process ‘by which organizational policies 
become instilled with value and ultimately taken for 
granted among external constituents’ (Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004: 440). It entails a ‘reciprocal 
typification of habitualized actions by types of actors 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 72). However, 
institutionalization happens to organizations overtime 
and ‘infuse with value beyond technical requirements 
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of tasks’ (Selznick, 1957). This process proceeds till 
something is institutionalized, this occurs only ‘when 
it is unquestioned and taken for granted’ (Hasselbladh 
and Kallinkos, 2000; Sandhue, 2009:82). 
As the substantive theory indicates, the 
institutionalization of BCG is now derived by a 
regulative pillar and legitimacy which is based on 
coercive mechanisms. However, normative pressures 
do exist, and with greater efforts from professional 
bodies such as EBI and the EIOD, overtime BCG 
practices may be adopted by the logic of 
appropriateness. This can occur because ‘professional 
training institutions are important centres for the 
development of organizational norms among 
professional managers and their staff’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983: 152).Such leads toward isomorphism 
and the adoption of BCG due to normative pressures. 
Overtime the wide spread of adoption of BCG 
practices will be taken for granted within the culture-
cognitive institutional structure. Only then will BCG 
be considered fully institutionalized (Suchman, 1995).  
This incorporates a type of legitimacy that is neither 
based on serving particular interests but as an 
evaluation related to duty and doing the right thing. It 
is based on ‘necessary or … based on some taken-for-
granted cultural account’ (Suchman, 1995:582). This 
type legitimacy reflects ‘preconscious standards’ 
related to how organizational activities should be 
performed (Mason et al., 2007: 293). 
The substantive theory developed here also 
indicated that banking organizations based their 
corporate governance identity on a compliance or 
avoidance strategy (by disguising non-compliance 
tactics) (Oliver, 1991). Organizational responses to 
external pressures are an important aspect of NIST. 
Here the substantive theory has shown how some 
banking organizations adopt arising BCG 
requirements by real compliance, while other banks 
comply by appearance only or on ‘ceremonial basis’ 
(Meyer and  Rowan,  1977).Banks disguising non-
compliance do so because they too seek legitimacy, 
but they have internal organizational characteristics 
that hinder implementation and are more susceptible 
to external obstacles. Moreover, as a result of the 
CBE coercive pressures as well as the EBI and EIOD 
increasing normative pressures banks will either 
comply or move to another strategic choice such as 
‘defiance’ which involves openly challenging or 
lobbying to influence the environment and make it 
more amenable for their needs (Fiss, 2008). As 
Carruthers (1995:324) identified ‘organizations play 
an active role in constructing rationalized myths, 
playing them off against each other, or shaping how 
they are applied in particular instances, organizations 
are not only granted legitimacy; sometimes they go 
out and get it’. 
Therefore, the substantive theory can be 
explained within the NIST framework, but not on the 
traditional basis of homogeneity of organizational 
responses, rather on the basis of accepting that 
organizations respond to institutional pressures in 
different ways through various strategies such as 
acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate 
(Oliver,  1991: 152). Overall, NIST offers a means of 
accounting for environmental factors and institutional 
change relating to the substantive theory. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Through a grounded theory study of corporate 
governance of the EBS, this paper has built a 
substantive theory that identified the drivers for 
change in Egyptian BCG. The substantive theory also 
accounted for contextual factors in which the BCG 
phenomenon is embedded including; management 
control, competence of board members and 
employees and organizational perception of corporate 
governance as well as the legal and regulatory 
frameworks. It also identified obstacles to corporate 
governance reform in terms of board of director 
ineffectiveness, short-termism and immature 
corporate governance culture in banks. Finally, the 
substantive theory accounted for the processes for 
dealing with BCG reform; that is, actions / 
interactions between banks and CBE. Indeed, the 
substantive theory identified the outcome of 
interaction between the structure and processes that 
lead to the evolution of BCG practices as well as 
enhanced legitimacy of banks and perceived better 
protection of stakeholder interests.  
Subsequently, NIST was utilized to further 
explore the substantive theory. This further 
substantiated that corporate governance involved a 
social phenomenon that is affected by its 
environmental context as well as legal, organizational, 
political and cultural aspects i.e. it is socially 
constructed. Corporate governance practices evolve 
and continuously interact with the surrounding 
environment. Moreover, corporate governance reform 
involves a process of institutionalization derived from 
the regulative and normative pillars with the objective 
of achieving legitimacy. Unlike both shareholder and 
stakeholder models the substantive theory posits that 
banks adopt corporate governance practices seeking 
legitimacy regardless of efficiency. Further 
assessment of the substantive theory through NIST 
identifies that Egyptian corporate governance 
phenomenon involves a social process, embedded and 
attached to the institutional context; the phenomenon 
is affected by non-economic factors which 
incorporates legal, regulatory, human, organizational 
and cultural factors. Consequently, corporate 
governance is dynamic and continuously evolving. 
Organizational responses cannot be regimental 
because internal characteristics of the affect how 
corporate governance structures are affected by 
institutional pressures. 
This paper attempted to further corporate 
governance theorizing and used NIST to explain the 
heterogeneity of organizational responses to 
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institutional and environmental pressures. Institutional 
explanation improves our understanding of the 
corporate governance phenomenon in general, and 
provides empirically evidence of the inability of the 
traditional corporate governance theorizing to capture 
the complex corporate governance phenomenon.  
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